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Abstract: This paper shows that the features that characterize the exchange of 
information among individuals vary depending on the type of information exchanged 
(novel or specific) and the institutional affiliation of the individuals involved. It 
unbundles the concept of strong and weak links into three main tie characteristics: trust, 
friendship and reciprocity. Using data from a survey of nanotechnology researchers, we 
identify the characteristics of 594 links between researchers and individuals from 
different institutional groups (firms, governmental organizations and universities). 
Findings suggest behavioral regularities that are contingent on the kind of information 
being exchanged and the contact’s institutional membership. For, instance, when 
university researchers exchange novel information between themselves, the level of trust 
becomes essential, but exchanges with individuals from other institutional settings (firms 
and governmental organizations) will be characterized instead by reciprocity and 
friendship. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on the relational 
perspective of social networks and university-society relationships. 
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2011/09 
3 
1 Introduction	
It is widely accepted that value creation activities draw on resources like information and 
knowledge, among others. Scholars have underlined the critical importance of investing 
in social relationships for acquiring such resources (Powell, 1990; Hansen, 1999; Lin, 
2001). In fact, the establishment of social linkages between different types of actors has 
been considered as one of the most important channels through which information and 
other resources flow across different institutional spheres (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 
2000; Molas-Gallart et al., 2000).  
The analysis of social links has a great tradition in sociology going back to the classic 
work of Granovetter (1973). Granovetter argues that the strength of the links can explain 
how access to information takes place; particularly, he suggests that novel information 
flows through weak ties. Granovetter defines tie strength in terms of four main 
characteristics of the link: amount of time, emotional intimacy (or friendship), mutual 
confiding (or trust) and reciprocity.  
Nevertheless, the literature highlights some additional difficulties that exchange partners 
face when transferring knowledge and information through social relations: actors may 
have divergent objectives and interests (Bouty, 2000; Wicks & Berman, 2004), and 
trading imbalances between partners may emerge during the process of exchange 
(Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Scholars have emphasized that these difficulties are 
significantly greater among actors from different institutional contexts; for instance, 
when they belong to different types of organizations (Powell, 1990; Bouty, 2000). As 
some researchers have pointed out, when two individuals interact instrumentally, they 
represent an interpersonal tie but also the group (Brass et al., 2004) and institutional 
spheres (Leydesdorff, 2000) of which they are members. In other words, the 
characteristics of the individual tie cannot explain by themselves the way information is 
accessed by actors: there is a need to consider the role of context, and in particular of 
institutional affiliation. The sources and effects of friendship, trust and reciprocity can 
differ across institutional contexts (Keefer & Knack, 2005; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006). For 
instance, the role of friendship in providing access to novel information may be different 
if the friend comes from a firm or from a government agency. 
This interrelation between the characteristics of the tie and the institutional context 
framing the tie has not been addressed in the literature, and it is the object of this paper. 
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We will argue that the characteristics of a tie (friendship, trust, reciprocity) predict 
different exchange behaviors depending on the institutional affiliations of the partners. In 
short, this study stresses that institutional affiliation determines which tie characteristics 
are in the best interest for the exchange of information to take place. 
The manner in which relational and institutional traits interact in exchange relationships 
has proved difficult to address. The traditional approach has focused on the relationship 
between the strength of the link (strong vs. weak ties) and the type of information 
(specific vs. novel) that flows through partners (E.g.: Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992; 
Hansen, 1999; Levin & Cross, 2004). Additionally, the extant literature applies a narrow 
operationalization of the concept of tie strength: studies measure tie strength by taking 
into consideration one, some, but never all the four tie characteristics identified by 
Granovetter. Consequently, the results could be biased, given that the concept of tie 
strength is multidimensional (Marsden & Campbell, 1984).To provide a more complete 
vision on information exchange processes within collaborative relationships, we include 
in our study all the four tie characteristics. We use these to characterize the one-to-one 
exchanges (dyadic relations), and analyze how institutional affiliation is related to the 
way in which individuals conduct information exchanges for two different types of 
information (specific and novel).  
We first define and operationalize the main concepts used in the study and review briefly 
the literature about information transfer and social links, with a special focus on the 
importance of institutional affiliations. Then, we formulate hypotheses about how 
friendship, trust and reciprocity are related to the access to specific and novel information 
when exchange partners belong or not to the same institutional spheres. Afterwards, we 
present the empirical study; data, methodology and statistical techniques, followed by the 
analysis and comments on the results. Finally, we turn to the discussion and implications 
of this work on the relational perspective of social networks and university-society 
relationships literatures. 
2 Information	access	and	tie	strength	
Previous studies have shown that people habitually turn to others to acquire information 
(Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992), making social interaction an important aspect of 
knowledge transfer processes. The type of information and knowledge commonly 
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transmitted through social ties is basically of two types: specific and novel (Rowley et 
al., 2000; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001).  
Information is specific when interaction between individuals leads them to the 
acquisition of detailed information about the partner’s activities, capacities, intentions 
and objectives (Uzzi, 1997; Rowley et al., 2000). Specific information is therefore fine-
grained and adapted to the partner’s needs and provides more in-depth knowledge about 
a particular area of interest for the actors, helping them to complete and evaluate their 
own knowledge. Specific information is frequently tacit because it can only be combined 
and transferred between actors with a certain level of shared knowledge and experiences 
(Polanyi, 1966; Uzzi, 1997; McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004). In contrast, novel 
information refers to information about general events within the environment, such as 
emerging technologies, innovations or other significant changes. This type of information 
tends to be extensive and new. Moreover, it covers a greater variety of topics, which may 
or may not be of particular interest to the objectives of the actors. Its general nature 
makes its codification and transfer easier, even without a basis of interpersonal 
interaction (Rowley et al., 2000; McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004). A large body of 
literature argues that the type of information actors tend to exchange depends on the type 
of connection developed between them. 
Analysts have traditionally grouped connections into two categories: strong and weak 
ties1. Many researchers agree that specific information is better transferred via strong ties 
and novel information via weak ones (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1997; Hansen, 1999; 
Rowley et al., 2000). Strong ties are based on trust, friendship, reciprocity and frequency 
of interaction (Krackhardt, 1992; Uzzi, 1997; Brass et al., 1998; Reagans & Zuckerman, 
2001). Trust facilitates cooperation among social actors (Brass et al., 1998), as well as 
transactions of resources and information (Krackhardt, 1992). Interaction frequency 
provides the necessary experience to allow participants to predict (a) which specific 
information the other needs, and (b) how the shared information would be utilized by the 
partner (Krackhardt, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). As a result, these strong links provide in-depth 
and specific knowledge in a particular area of interest for the individuals involved 
(Rowley et al., 2000), thereby contributing to knowledge creation and dissemination 
capabilities. Therefore, when a strong tie exists, individuals acquire detailed knowledge 
                                                 
1 This typology has its origin in Granovetter’s (1973: 1361) seminal work.  
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about the other’s capabilities, attitudes, behaviors and objectives, and hence detailed and 
customized information is exchanged. 
In contrast, weak ties are defined as casual acquaintances between social actors (Brass et 
al., 1998), characterized by an infrequency of interaction (Granovetter, 1973) and based 
on neither friendship, trust nor reciprocity. However, these links can act as “local 
bridges” to other social circles beyond the individual’s immediate environment, 
providing new information about opportunities and/or the availability of other resources 
(Granovetter, 1973; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). In other words, weak ties are more 
significant to the discovery of new sources of resources because they are more likely to 
connect actors from different social circles (Granovetter, 1973). 
3 Information	access,	tie	characteristics	and	 institutional	
affiliation	
The impact of social ties on the reception of knowledge and information might however 
be contingent on the type of contact (Silverman & Baum, 2002). Tie characteristics 
(friendship, trust and reciprocity) may vary in level, degree and nature across institutional 
borders (Keefer & Knack, 2005; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006; Olk & Gibbons, 2010), because 
of the idiosyncratic differences in value systems, cultures and norms inherent to each 
particular institutional sphere. In fact, Zaheer and Zaheer (2006) believe that exchange 
behavior depends on shared expectations, which are influenced by the different 
institutional spheres in which actors are embedded. Therefore, different institutional 
conditions can lead individuals to different exchange expectations. If expectations shape 
behavior, then it is likely that a particular actor will base their exchanges on one or more 
of the aforementioned relational characteristics, depending on their partners’ institutional 
membership. This would hold especially true in the case of professionals that operate in 
multiple institutional environments. These professionals often maintain diverse logics of 
exchange with their partners (Dunn & Jones, 2011). Nevertheless, there are few studies 
that explicitly take into account exchange behaviors among partners from different 
institutional contexts and systematically analyze which relational features play a 
significant role in the transfer of both types of information.  
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The following sections develop hypothetical relations between a) varying degrees of tie 
characteristics (friendship, trust and reciprocity), b) access to both types of information 
and c) partners’ institutional membership. 
3.1 Friendship	and	access	to	information	
Friendship entails emotional involvement with another person, and thus an interpersonal 
attachment and identification (Parsons, 1915; Blau, 1964). The parties’ mutual affection 
and explicit interest in maintaining the relationship provide them with sufficient 
incentives to offer benefits to each other (Blau, 1964). Therefore, friendship implies 
commitment, in the sense that individuals tend to make periodic contributions to the 
relationship without expecting a reciprocal benefit for each particular contribution. An 
important consequence of friendship is precisely this sense of duty arising among 
individuals and the intrinsic motivation for being helpful (Blau, 1964; Granovetter, 
1983). That is to say, friends do not shirk the social obligations between them (Parsons, 
1915). In addition, friendship is greatly influenced by emotional and moral factors 
(Adams, 1967; Lydon et al., 1997; Olk & Gibbons, 2010).  
According to social exchange theory, friendship begins with an attraction to others who 
are socially similar and results from homophilious relationships evoked by expressive 
actions (Homans, 1950; Blau, 1964; Lin, 2001). Within this traditional approach, 
friendship ties identify clusters of people living in similar circumstances and possessing 
similar resources (or information) (Granovetter, 1973). Friends from the same 
institutional sphere will share the same value system, mores, and culture, as well as the 
same or very similar information resources (Törnblom & Fredholm, 1984). Therefore, it 
is unlikely that friends from the same institutional sphere will exchange novel 
information. 
Nevertheless, friendship can occur among people from different social circles or 
institutional spheres (Villanueva-Felez, 2011). In this case, actors come into contact with 
information generated from within different institutional circles. The periodic 
contributions made by these friends to the relationship could be in the form of 
information about opportunities in their respective institutional sphere, which will be 
novel for both concerned. On this basis, we posit the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Friendship is positively related to the access to novel information when 
partners do not belong to the same institutional sphere. 
While friendship may be positively related with the access to novel information, its effect 
on specific information is subject to conflicting influences. Friends are bound by “norms 
of loyalty” and may engage in unequal exchange that can therefore be considered 
inefficient (Clark, 1981; Törnblom & Fredholm, 1984; Bicchieri & Muldoon, 2011). 
Such inefficiencies emerge when the needs of the actors differ; then, the benefits given 
and received will not be comparable (Clark, 1981; Törnblom & Fredholm, 1984), 
resulting in an asymmetric relationship. Yet, the transfer of specific information requires 
efficient coordination between the parties (Hansen, 1999; Rowley et al., 2000), which 
stand in contrast to the inefficiencies related to friendship. Therefore, although friendship 
may support the exchange of specific information, it can also introduce inefficiencies in 
this exchange and thus work against it. For these reasons, friendship sometimes enhances 
the transfer of specific information, but in other occasions it may impede the attainment 
of this objective. Accordingly, we can hypothesize that the two effects cancel each other. 
Hypothesis 2: Regardless of the partners’ institutional affiliation, friendship does not 
significantly affect the access to specific information. 
3.2 Trust	and	access	to	information	
Rousseau et al. (1998: 395) define trust as “a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectation of the intentions or 
behavior of another”. It is based on both the perceived likelihood that implicit or explicit 
agreements will not be infringed upon (Madhok, 1995), and the belief that an exchange 
partner does not or will not act exclusively in a self-interested manner (Uzzi, 1997). 
Additionally, it is agreed that the development of trust increases flexibility and tolerance 
among partners. Trust is especially important in situations where ambiguity is present 
and the actors are contributing their own resources to achieve mutual benefits (Madhok, 
1995). 
Trust is likewise related to behavioral patterns. Aulakh et al. (1996) demonstrate that the 
fact that two partners trust each other is positively related to the establishment of 
governance mechanisms in the relationship. Under the umbrella of trust, actors often 
forgo including explicit details in their contractual agreements, even if this behavior 
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increases their exposure to risk (Macaulay, 1963). Consequently, reliance on trust 
becomes a significant modus operandi in exchanges implying risk and vulnerability for 
those involved (Coleman, 1990), and where uncertainty is present because performance 
is difficult to measure (Madhok, 1995).  
Nevertheless, building trust is not without cost (Madhok, 1995; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006). 
Creation of trust involves a significant investment of resources for both participants in 
the relationship, e.g. their time, their monetary assets, etc. (Madhok, 1995). In fact, 
Wicks and Berman (2004) hold that such a costly governance mechanism should be 
employed only when it is essential: in situations with considerable degrees of uncertainty, 
vulnerability and interdependency (Madhok, 1995; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006).  
Levin and Cross (2004) point out that, depending on the type of knowledge being 
accessed trust performs a major or minor role in the exchange. When accessing novel 
information, trust may not be critical: information can be codified and therefore remains 
independent of the source’s competency (Levin & Cross, 2004). In this situation, partners 
do not need to invest in trust to ensure their access to novel information. In fact, the 
literature suggests that investments in trust are an inefficient way to acquire novel 
information (Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 1999; Rowley et al., 2000; Levin & Cross, 
2004).  
Nevertheless, we believe that the aforementioned state concerning the transfer of novel 
information is only valid when the contacts are not direct competitors. Ties with potential 
competitors are more difficult to manage because of the greater opportunities to behave 
opportunistically (Silverman & Baum, 2002). These difficulties increase when agents 
operate within technologically dynamic contexts. In such environments, the agents’ 
performance is positively related to early access to new information (Powell, 1990; 
Rowley et al., 2000). In cases of co-opetition, the exchange of novel information could 
lead to situations where actors are exposed to risk and vulnerability. In these 
circumstances, trust helps partners in an exchange to predict what each other will do and 
can do with the newly supplied information, facilitating the transfer of information.  
It is unlikely that partners from different institutional spheres will be direct competitors 
as they usually operate in different contexts and may even have different kinds objectives 
(Powell, 1990). Therefore, when the contact comes from another institutional context, 
trust may not be a requirement to access novel information (no risk is present). On the 
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contrary, potential competitors conventionally come from the same institutional sphere. 
In this case, trust is likely a prerequisite for the transfer of novel information to take 
place. On the basis of the above, we propose the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3a: Trust does not significantly affect novel information access when 
partners do not belong to the same institutional sphere. 
Hypothesis 3b: Trust is positively related to novel information access when partners 
belong to the same institutional sphere. 
Within a relationship based on trust, partners manifest a mutually positive orientation 
towards one another (Madhok, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). This orientation, within 
relationships based on trust, help the actors attain a significant level of efficient 
coordination. The literature is replete with studies that demonstrate the positive impact of 
trust on cooperation, support and joint problem-solving between actors (Uzzi, 1997; 
Levin & Cross, 2004; McEvily & Marcus, 2005). Therefore, trust offers the conditions 
that permit and enhance the exchange of specific information between actors. Levin and 
Cross (2004) demonstrate that the greater the level of trust the easier it is to transfer 
specific information that positively influences a knowledge seeker’s work. In this 
situation, actors must trust the competence of their sources, because the access to specific 
information directly affects actors’ work performance.  
The degree of risk, uncertainty and vulnerability incurred when exchanging specific 
information could certainly vary, depending on the partner’s institutional affiliation. It is 
possible that risk and vulnerability is greater in links with actors from the same 
institutional sphere (greater likelihood of being competitors), while partners from 
different institutional spheres experience greater levels of uncertainty. In any case, and 
regardless of the actors’ institutional affiliation, the exchange of specific information is 
linked to situations of either risk or vulnerability or uncertainty. Therefore, we posit the 
following: 
Hypothesis 4: Regardless of the partners’ institutional affiliation, trust is always 
positively related to the access to specific information. 
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3.3 Reciprocity	and	access	to	information	
Reciprocity2 is understood as the coequal investment and result perceived by each 
member in a social relationship, related to the individual’s internal standards (Pritchard, 
1969). It can likewise be defined as an exchange pattern of mutual benefits between two 
actors (Gouldner, 1960). Reciprocity, unlike friendship, does not necessarily rest on 
mutual identity because individuals are not compelled to be emotionally invested in the 
relationship. Nevertheless, reciprocity induces a feeling of indebtedness among and 
towards exchange partners (Westphal & Clement, 2008). Consequently, reciprocity 
imposes obligations on the actors: actors must accept and repay favors offered even those 
unsolicited (Gouldner, 1960; Westphal & Clement, 2008). 
Uhl & Maslyn (2003) believe that reciprocal behavior can be understood by 
decomposing it into its three constituent elements: equivalence, immediacy and interest. 
Equivalence refers to the equal amount of goods and services given and received within 
the relationship. Other authors specify instead that equivalence requires the value of what 
is exchanged to be roughly equivalent (Gouldner, 1960; Westphal & Clement, 2008). 
Immediacy refers to the period of time between the action of receiving a good or service 
and its repayment. Interest refers to the actors’ motives behind the exchange. Classical 
exchange theorists suggest that the primary motive for acting reciprocally is individual 
self-interest (Homans, 1950; Blau, 1964), with the specific goal of increasing the 
likelihood of receiving future favors (Westphal & Clement, 2008).  
In short, reciprocity has the peculiar characteristic of combining dichotomies within the 
same behavior: generosity and self-interest, altruism and egoism, or freedom and 
obligation, which are not mutually exclusive, but rather coexist (Komter, 2007).  
Social exchange theory suggests that both types of information exchange are directly 
related to positive reciprocity. Particularly within instrumental relationships, the 
information recipient will likely repay in kind in order to eliminate this debt (Clark, 
1981) and thereby ensure the relationship’s good health. We believe this especially holds 
true for the exchanges of novel information, regardless of the partner’s institutional 
                                                 
2 Earlier influential authors, such as Gouldner (1960) and Blau (1964), consider both positive and negative 
reciprocity. Negative reciprocity refers to retaliation measures taken in response to harmful acts previously 
carried out by the partner (Gouldner, 1960; Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003). In this paper, we refer only to 
positive reciprocity. 
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affiliation. As mentioned above, the transfer of novel information does neither entail 
great effort nor significant material cost for the partners. Therefore, within this exchange 
actors will likely perceive that equivalence and immediacy are easy to attain. 
Nevertheless, a reciprocal transfer of specific information is more difficult to achieve 
when partners belong to different institutional spheres. The relative value of this kind of 
information may likely differ from one institutional sphere to the other. The transfer of 
specific information often involves significant costs –financial, temporal and 
managerial– for the partners. The value of these resources may likewise vary from one 
institutional sphere to the other. Therefore, when partners belong to distinct institutional 
spheres, they will find it more difficult to agree on the value of the information given and 
received. Each actor needs to account for both the value of the costs incurred by the 
sender, as well as the value of the benefits received when repaying the exchange. 
Consequently, this equivalence feature of reciprocity may not be easily attained. Partners 
from the same institutional sphere face comparable conditions, and are therefore more 
likely to reach equivalent assessments of resource value within their exchanges. Based on 
the above, we posit the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 5: Regardless of the partners’ institutional affiliation, reciprocity will always 
be positively related to the access to novel information. 
Hypothesis 6: When partners belong to the same institutional sphere, reciprocity will be 
positively related to the access to specific information. 
4 Methods	
4.1 Sample	
Testing the hypotheses presented in the preceding section required a context where we 
could identify individuals who: (1) depend on their access to both types of information 
(novel and specific) to carry out their work, and (2) usually interact professionally with 
other actors from the same and other institutional spheres. For these reasons, we selected 
the field of academic research in nanotechnology. Nano-researchers focus on the 
development of technologies at the nano-scale (i.e. in the length of approximately 1–100 
nm range); they thus require costly equipment such as clean rooms, extremely high-
powered microscopes, powerful lasers, etc., that have to be obtained and operated in 
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collaboration with other researchers in academia, industry or government laboratories. 
Moreover, nanotechnology is an area of research where traditional disciplines merge —
material science, molecular biology, chemistry and physics (Stix, 2001)— and where 
collaboration with other researchers has become essential (Islam & Miyazaki, 2009; 
Palmberg et al., 2009)  
Nevertheless, nanotechnology is a very broad and inclusive term with vague boundaries 
(Meyer et al., 2004). Research in this field includes areas as diverse as medical 
applications, electronics, robotics, metrology, instrumentation, environment, etc. These 
areas of knowledge do not necessarily share a direct link, on the contrary, there is 
considerable cognitive distance between some of them (Meyer & Libaers, 2008), 
resulting in differing resource requirements and ways of collaborating with other actors.  
To deal with such heterogeneity and obtain a controlled and homogeneous sample, we 
limited this study to the relationships maintained by scientists working in a specific, more 
homogeneous, sub-field: advanced materials at the nanoscale. The sample for this study 
included academics at state-funded research centers. We selected 11 research centers that 
had explicitly stated (via public reports or on their web site) that nano-materials 
represented their primary research activity; and had published through their website their 
researchers’ names and e-mail address. We identified 866 individuals using this 
procedure. 
4.2 Data	Collection	
We conducted a web survey among these nano-materials researchers. We had previously 
piloted a preliminary version of the survey instrument with 10 experts on organizational 
studies and innovation. The second version of the questionnaire was tested in March 
2008 with 6 nanotechnology researchers from Spain and Holland who were not included 
in our sample. This second version underwent extensive qualitative pretesting that 
involved in-depth interviews with the 6 researchers. Each interview was approximately 
30 minutes in length. We used feedback from the interviews to refine the wording of the 
questions, the scales of the answers and the overall presentation of the survey3. The 
survey was also designed and tested in both Spanish and English to address those 
researchers whose mother tongue was not Spanish. 
                                                 
3 See Annex A for the final version of the survey. 
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The survey was launched in April 2008. We also followed a variety of actions to elicit a 
higher response rate: a multiple contact strategy (prenotice e-mail message, e-mail with 
questionnaire, follow-ups and reminders), and the personalization of all e-mails and 
questionnaires (Dillman, 2007). We received 213 responses, which constituted a 25% 
response rate. From this group, we excluded incomplete cases and those respondents who 
did not report at least one tie with an external organization4. To reduce the probability of 
errors arising from the inclusion of researchers working in other nanotechnology sub-
areas, we incorporated two qualifying questions to confirm that respondents were 
working on nano-materials.  
Following these filtering stages, the final data set was comprised of 161 individuals: 33 
full professors (20.5%), 79 associated scientists (49.1%) and 49 post-doctoral researchers 
and doctoral students (30.4%). These respondents reported a total of 594 ties with firms, 
governmental organizations and universities. Table 1 summarizes the relationships 
reported, by group. 
TABLE 1: Final Sample  
 
Full Professors Associated scientists PostDocs/Docs TOTAL 
n. % 
Nr of ties 
per 
individual 
n. % 
Nr of ties 
per 
individual
n. % 
Nr of ties 
per 
individual 
n. % 
Nr of ties 
per 
individual
Firm 36 23.7 1.09 67 22.8 0.85 25 16.9 0.51 128 21.5 0.80 
Governmental 
organization 38 25.0 1.15 87 29.6 1.10 50 33.8 1.02 175 29.5 1.09 
University 78 51.3 2.36 140 51.3 1.77 73 49.3 1.49 291 49.0 1.81 
TOTAL 152 100 4.61 294 100 3.72 148 100 3.02 594 100 3.69 
 
4.3 Unit	of	Analysis	and	Measures	
Unit of analysis: The unit of analysis is the interpersonal relationship between a 
researcher and his/her main contact at those organizations collaborating with the 
scientist. Thus, all the relations analyzed are manifestly positive, instrumental and 
external. The relevance of this unit of analysis is well justified throughout the literature. 
Scholars have found that the locus of control in scientific collaboration lies more on 
individuals than the organizations they represent, particularly when academic institutions 
                                                 
4 In order to increase the probability of reported contacts from other institutional spheres, we explicitly 
asked to exclude contacts from their own organization.  
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are involved (Liebeskind et al., 1996; Bozeman & Corley, 2004). The know-how and 
information that researchers accumulate over time constitute their own knowledge stocks 
(McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004); consequently, the exchange of knowledge takes place 
primarily between people and within the context of personal relationships (Oliver & 
Liebeskind, 1997). Therefore, scientific collaboration is intrinsically a social process, 
where individuals, not organizations, are the key actors (Powell, 1990; Katz & Martin, 
1997; Oliver & Liebeskind, 1997). This implies a complex, and dynamic interaction 
between the actors involved, less guided by formal structures of authority and more 
dependent on the relationship among individuals (Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996; Bozeman & 
Corley, 2004).  
Dependent variables: We used two dependent variables—the access to novel 
information and specific information—. Novel information access is a one-item variable 
and detects if respondents’ contacts supply them with information related to advances 
and discoveries in general. We asked respondents to indicate to what extent they agreed 
with the following statement about their main contact person at the reported 
organizations: “This person supplies me with information related to advances and 
discoveries in general”. Specific information access is another one-item variable and 
refers to the transfer of information adapted to the researcher’s needs and supplied by 
their contacts. In a similar manner, we asked respondents to indicate to what extent they 
agreed with the following statement about their main contact person at the reported 
organizations: “This person supplies me with information adapted to my own research 
needs”. 
We developed and refined the scales of both variables using feedback from the pretest 
interviews. Initially, a five-point Likert-type response format (from completely agree to 
completely disagree) was employed to define the scales of both variables. The final 
version included 4-point agree-disagree scales, with the middle term removed.  
Independent variables: The independent variables addressed the qualitative 
characteristics of the personal ties contained in Granovetter’s tie strength definition 
(emotional intensity, mutual confiding, and reciprocal services). According to 
Krackhardt (1992), there are two types of tie characteristics: quantitative and qualitative. 
The quantitative features refer to the amount of time in Granovetter’s definition—i.e 
interaction frequency and years in contact—and are the objective aspect of the tie. The 
qualitative features of the tie refer to the other characteristics in Granovetter’s 
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definition—i.e., intimacy, mutual confiding and reciprocity—and are inherently 
subjective and interpretive aspects of the tie, given they represent in some way the value 
that the relationship has for the actors. 
The degree of friendship reflects the emotional intensity of a relationship (Gibbons, 
2004). We considered that a friend is an individual who the respondent identifies as such. 
We asked respondents to indicate to what extent they agreed with the following 
statement: “I consider this person my friend” (where “this person” refers to the 
respondent’s main contact person at the other organization). The degree of trust refers to 
the mutual confiding aspect. We asked respondents to specify to what extent they 
considered his/her main contact person trustworthy. The level of reciprocity was 
constructed similar to Friendkin (1980), using two items: whether the researcher asked 
the main contact person for personal and professional advice and, conversely, whether 
the contact person asked the researcher for advice. The results were then averaged. This 
measurement underlines to what extent both individuals are proactive and their role in the 
relationship as both advice-seekers and advice-provider. The scales of all the items 
contained in these three variables were set to the five-point Liker-type (from completely 
agree to completely disagree). 
Although no hypothesis was formulated concerning the relation between the amount of 
time (per Granovetter’s definition), the access to information and the partners’ 
institutional affiliation, two additional variables were included in our models: interaction 
frequency and years in contact. The first indicates the frequency of contact between the 
researcher and his contact. It is an ordinal variable with five categories ranging from 
weekly to yearly. Years in contact addresses the life span of the relationship. It is an 
ordinal variable containing five time ranges. 
Control variables: We controlled for aspects that recurrently appear in the literature of 
innovation studies and university-society relationship. First, the models included 
attributes of the actors involved in the relationship. On the one hand, respondents’ 
academic rank and type of research were addressed with two dummy variables. The first, 
distinguishes between full professors, associate scientists and post-doctoral/doctoral 
researchers. The second classifies academics according to the type of research they 
conduct: pure fundamental, pure applied and a combination of fundamental and applied 
research. We also controlled for the contacts’ geographical location through another 
dummy variable which distinguishes if the contacts are regional, national or international. 
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Finally, we controlled for the formal collaborative activities the researchers carried out 
with their contact organizations. Thus, three dichotomous variables were created to check 
if both actors were collaborating through 1) joint research or contract research 
agreements, 2) publications or 3) other activities (consultancy agreements, creation of 
new facilities/spin-offs and training)5. 
4.4 Analysis	Techniques	
We employed ordered logit regressions to analyze the data, using the Stata 11 software 
package. Robust estimators (Huber-White sandwich) were used to estimate standard 
errors. These estimators are considered robust because they provide correct standard 
errors in the presence of violations (e.g. heteroscedasticity) of the assumptions of the 
model (Long & Freese, 2001). Moreover, working with dyadic data can imply a violation 
of the assumption that the observations are independent. Since a single researcher can 
have relationships with different partners, our respondents were allowed to report 
multiple relationships. As a result, the error terms in the regression could be affected, 
given that they can be correlated across observations from the same source. To account 
for this, we used a cluster option in the estimation to indicate that the observations 
(relationships) were clustered into individuals. Therefore, the ties reported were possibly 
correlated within the responses given by one particular individual, but would remain 
independent between the 161 researchers. The robust cluster technique affects the 
estimated standard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, but not the 
estimated coefficients (Long & Freese, 2001). 
5 Results	
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics, frequencies and Kendall’s tau-b correlation 
coefficients of the total sample. In general, aggregated results show significant 
correlations between dependent and independent variables, as well as adequate 
correlation among the independent variables. 
 
 
                                                 
5 For further information see the questionnaire in Annex A. 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficientsab 
 Variables Mean/ Frequency 
s.d./  
% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Novel Information 2.75 0.836          
2. Specific Information 2.90 0.762 0,59**         
3. Interaction Frequency 2.81 1.026 0,22** 0,26**        
4. Years in contact 3.55 1.166 0,14** 0,16** 0,08*       
5. Friendship 3.41 1.105 0,38** 0,34** 0,27** 0,35**      
6. Trust 4.00 0.862 0,39** 0,37** 0,23** 0,25** 0,58**     
7. Reciprocity 3.31 0.921 0,35** 0,34** 0,26** 0,24** 0,51** 0,41**    
8. Research Projects 514 86.5% 0,06 0,12** 0,06 -0,01 0,02 0,04 0,01   
9. Publications 345 58.1% 0,11** 0,19** 0,11** 0,23** 0,19** 0,18** 0,15** -0,03  
10. 
Other Collaboration 
Activities 
180  30.3% 0,04 0,01 0,07 0,08* 0,11** 0,08* 0,07* -0,20** -0,02 
a Non-parametric Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficients. Two-tailed test.  
b N = 594 
**p< 0,01, *p< 0,05 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the ordered logit regression models for the access to 
information. We report a total of 4 models: two for partners from the industry and 
government institutional spheres and two more for university partners (one model 
analyzes the access to novel information and the other the access to specific information). 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that friendship is positively related to the access to novel 
information when the partner is from a different institutional sphere (i.e. firms and 
governmental organizations). This hypothesis is confirmed (p<0.01). Hypothesis 2 
predicted no effect of friendship on accessing specific information, regardless of the 
contacts’ institutional affiliation. Models 2 and 4 fully support this hypothesis. 
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TABLE 3: Results of Ordered Logit Regression on Information Access 
 Industry & Government University 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Novel Information Specific Information Novel Information Specific Information
CONTROL         
Research Type         
Basic 0.12 (0.33) -0.08 (0.34) -0.31 (0.36) -0.32 (0.35) 
Applied 0.09 (0.54) 0.42 (0.63) 0.67 (0.55) 0.73 (0.52) 
Academic Rank         
Professors -1.01* (0.55) -0.63 (0.50) 0.30 (0.56) -0.07 (0.57) 
Associate Lecturers & equivalent -1.05* (0.42) -0.68† (0.39) -0.22 (0.49) 0.04 (0.47) 
Geographical location         
Regional -0.29 (0.34) 0.23 (0.31) -0.89* (0.37) -0.33 (0.44) 
International 0.53* (0.31) 0.58† (0.30) -0.41 (0.35) 0.07 (0.35) 
Formal Collaboration Activities         
Research Projects 0.21 (0.39) 0.99* (0.38) 0.43 (0.41) 0.49 (0.43) 
Publications -0.25 (0.29) 0.23 (0.37) 0.08 (0.32) 0.37 (0.33) 
Others 0.29 (0.33) 0.15 (0.34) -0.38 (0.34) -0.35 (0.31) 
TIE CHARACTERISTICS         
Interaction Frequency 0.19 (0.13) 0.51** (0.13) 0.28 (0.17) 0.27† (0.15) 
Years in contact 0.08 (0.12) 0.18 (0.14) -0.04 (0.13) -0.01 (0.15) 
Friendship 0.65** (0.21) 0.31 (0.19) 0.15 (0.22) 0.18 (0.23) 
Trust 0.29 (0.19) 0.37* (0.19) 0.73** (0.28) 0.63** (0.28) 
Reciprocity 0.58** (0.22) 0.38 (0.24) 0.23 (0.24) 0.32 (0.19) 
# of observations (relationships) 303 303 291 291 
# of clusters (individuals) 128 128 129 129 
Log Pseudolikelihood -330.9 -290.1 -290.8 -248.4 
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.12 
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.1. 
 
Hypothesis 3a and 3b posited that trust only has a significant and positive effect on the 
access to novel information when partners in the relationship come from the same 
institutional sphere (no significant effect on the other cases was predicted). Both 
hypotheses are fully verified. Model 1 confirms no significant effect of trust on the 
access to novel information with partners from another institutional sphere (firms and 
governmental organizations). In the case of contacts from universities, trust has a 
significant and positive effect (p<0.01). Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relation 
between trust and the access to specific information in all cases. This hypothesis is 
supported in the case of relationships with industry and government members (p<0.05) as 
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well as in the case of university members (p<0.01). Hypothesis 5 suggested that, 
regardless of the contact’s institutional affiliation, reciprocity is positively related to the 
access to novel information. This hypothesis only holds for the case of relationships with 
members from other institutional spheres. Therefore, we reject it given that, in the case of 
relationships with universities, reciprocity does not have a significant effect on the access 
to novel information. Hypothesis 6 is also rejected. This hypothesis proposed a positive 
relationship between reciprocity and access to specific information, but only in those 
relationships with university members. Model 4 does not exhibit a significant coefficient 
for reciprocity.  
It is also noteworthy to observe that the access to specific information always requires 
interaction frequency for the individuals to transmit it. This result is completely in line 
with the literature. In the context of scientific knowledge production and innovation, 
exchange partners need to expend effort to ensure sufficient mutual understanding 
(McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004) and that they can put into use the newly acquired 
knowledge (Hansen, 1999). 
6 Discussion	
The results suggest several relevant conclusions about the way in which the 
characteristics of social ties relate to the information that is exchanged through them. 
First, the difference between novel and specific information is significant: the exchange 
of different types of information places diverse requirements on the characteristics of the 
social link through which such information circulates. This means that the exchange of 
different types of information cannot be treated equally; in other words, a single measure 
of tie strength is not enough to explain how different types of information can be 
accessed. The traditional differentiation between strong and weak ties needs to be 
unbundled. Granovetter (1973) notably argued that strong ties would not favor the access 
to novel information. Instead we have found positive relations between the acquisition of 
novel information and the qualitative components of tie strength. Why do our results 
apparently contradict Granovetter? 
Granovetter’s Strength of Weak Ties Theory (1973) holds that links connecting two 
different institutional spheres (i.e., “bridge ties”) are incapable of being strong. When 
developing his theory of strong ties, Granovetter only considers those relationships that 
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emerge in a natural manner between socially similar individuals: homophilious 
relationships evoked by expressive actions. He focuses his argument on friendship 
networks and assumes explicitly–and “by definition” (pp. 1362)–that a strong link 
always implies great commitments of time. At the same time, he assumes that individuals 
linked through a strong tie physically interact (pp. 1362), since a link’s strength depends 
on individuals spending a lot of time together. Consequently, in order for these physical 
meetings to be realized with the theoretical frequency demanded by a strong link, 
geographical distance should be small; otherwise it would obstruct the interaction 
between the actors. 
Implicitly, Granovetter only considers as “strong” those links that are the product of an 
intense and continuous social interaction. By extension, only two types of links exist for 
Granovetter: links positioned at the positive extreme of the continuum of the tie strength 
(strong ties), and the rest (weak ties). Consequently, heterophilious relationships, from 
the point of view of Granovetter, would always be relationships characterized by the 
existence of a weak tie as, and by definition, they connect dissimilar actors and therefore 
that tie can never be strong. The homophily principle, in which Granovetter bases his 
thesis, relies on the assumption that socially similar individuals, even when acting in 
their own interest, spend time together in the same place (Homans, 1950; Granovetter, 
1973; Burt, 1992). For this reason, relationships emerge naturally, forming clusters of 
people with similar tastes, lifestyles, and resources. Therefore, from this viewpoint, it is 
impossible that strong links can connect two different institutional spheres. 
However, when relationships between individuals do not arise in a spontaneous manner, 
but rather occur as a consequence of actors’ intentional collaboration with the aim of 
achieving a specific goal –i.e., instrumental actions–, social similarity among agents is no 
longer predetermined; quite the opposite: they join forces with the intention of accessing 
resources to achieve either a shared or complementary goals. This does not prevent them, 
as the results of this study verify, from developing a strong tie between them while 
remaining in their respective institutional sphere (for instance, the strong ties we 
identified between researchers and individuals working in firms or government 
organizations). In fact, as Mayer et al. (1995) point out, trust creation (one of the tie-
strength indicators), can be built by other means apart from social similarity. 
Consequently, in this case the strength of a tie will not be initiated by homophily 
principles.  
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The majority of bridge ties between two institutional spheres are likely to start as weak 
links. We do not argue against this aspect. However, part of the quality of those bridges 
varies to the extent that some of them trespass the barriers of institutional distance, 
becoming strong. When this happens such distance is transformed from a barrier to the 
development of relationships to an enhancer because it offers the agents involved in the 
link access to a broader variety of resources.  
When individuals seek out resources from other institutional environments, the chances 
of accessing them are greater if they are capable of contacting and developing a strong tie 
with other amenable individuals (though, not socially similar as the homophily principle 
predicts). The success of this relationship hinges on the degree of affinity between the 
two actors: the compatibility of their objectives, the degree to which each approves of the 
norms of the other’s institutional sphere, etc. This affinity is more difficult and costly to 
build when the actors are dissimilar; yet, the potential benefits are very high as the link 
allows access to new resources and, through its strength, affords opportunities to use 
them (Burt, 1992). 
The heterophilius relationships that develop into strong links can be explained by 
unbundling the notion of the strength of a social link into three elements: friendship, trust 
and reciprocity. We have shown how the logic of the exchange of novel information 
varies with the institutional location of the individuals involved.6 For instance, when two 
university researchers exchange novel information, trust is a key element in the 
relationship; trust may be important because when researchers ask for information to 
other scholars they become vulnerable in terms of reputation (Levin & Cross, 2004) as 
the request may indicate a lack of competence. Importantly, trust does not emerge as a 
relevant feature of the relationship when novel information is exchanged across 
institutional boundaries; in this situation, friendship and reciprocity characterize the link. 
As explained in the development of the hypotheses, trust is an expensive way to build a 
social links, and agents may draw on it only when necessary, i.e. when the exchange of 
information may indicate vulnerability or be conducted under of uncertainty. The 
friendship-base access to novel information across institutional boundaries may be 
indicating a benevolent exchange behavior in the interest of the relationship. 
                                                 
6 This is in line with Silverman and Baum (2002), who point that exchange behavior within cooperative 
relationships are contingent on the type of partner. That is, relations with different institutional actors result 
on different types of behaviors. 
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2011/09 
23 
Additionally, when academics exchange information with these actors some kind of 
immediate return may be required by the partners: both sides of the relationship will act 
in a calculating manner and only if a mutual benefit is expected.  
Finally, the logic of exchange when accessing specific information is different. Specific 
information implies the acquisition of detailed information about the partner’s activities, 
capacities, intentions and objectives (Uzzi, 1997; Rowley et al., 2000). In short, actors 
are able to obtain knowledge about their partners’ core competences and other important 
intangible assets. We identify three possible reasons for the exchange of specific 
information to be based on trust: (1) the tension between acquiring new knowledge and 
the fear of possible acts of plagiarism or the potential risk of knowledge spillover, (2) the 
possible existence of weak formal institutions that regulate exchange between researchers 
and other agents, given that “where institutional supports are weak, personal relationship 
and trust play a more prominent role” (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006: 23), (3) the existence of 
interdependency between partners; the need of trust increases with the level of 
interdependency (Wicks & Berman, 2004). In any of the aforementioned situations trust 
becomes a fundamental norm for the exchange to take place. 
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Annexes	
A. Survey. 
(1) We currently have the following information about you. If necessary, please provide any changes in the 
section below: 
Name: [!NAME!] [!SURNAME!] 
Research Group: [!RESEARCH GROUP!] 
Research Centre: [!RESEARCH CENTER!] 
(2) Gender: 
- Male 
- Female 
(3) Please indicate which position you hold at your institute: 
(Please indicate the option that most closely matches your actual position) 
- Full professor 
- Associate professor 
- Assistant professor 
- Postdoc 
- Ph.D. student 
- Other (please specify)  
(4) Which of the following features characterises your research most accurately? 
(Please select all those that apply) 
- Research and development at the atomic, molecular or macromolecular levels, in the length scale of approximately 
1−100 nanometer range. 
- It provides a fundamental understanding of phenomena and materials at the nanoscale. 
- It attempts to create and use structures, devices and systems that have novel properties and functions because of 
their small and/or intermediate size. 
- It attempts to control and manipulate on the atomic scale. 
- My research does not fit any of the above features. 
(5) To which of the following areas could your research be applied? 
(Please select all those that apply) 
- Materials 
- Medical applications (diagnostic and therapeutic) 
- Nano−electronics (−photonics, −magnetism) and information elaboration processes 
- Energy production and storage 
- Metrology and development of instruments 
- Food, water and environment 
- Manufacturing processes 
- Security and defense 
- Robotics 
- Other (please specify) 
(6) Do you have contacts with ORGANIZATIONS including firms, governmental agencies and institutions, 
academic organizations, etc. with which you have interacted in connection with your MAIN research? 
Please exclude your own research institute or centre, [!RESEARCH CENTER!]. 
- Yes 
- No > End questionnaire  
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(7) (8) (9) Please give the names or abbreviation of the principal ORGANISATIONS, including firms, 
governmental agencies and institutions, academic organizations, etc. with which you have interacted during the 
last two years in connection with your MAIN research. 
Please exclude your own research institute or centre, [!RESEARCH CENTER!]. 
In the following part of the questionnaire we will ask you questions related to the organizations reported here 
 (7) Name or abbreviation (8) Indicate the type of organization 
(9) Indicate the geographical 
location of your contact 
Organization 1 XXX Private firm Regional 
Organization 2 YYY Governmental agency or organization National 
Organization 3 ZZZ Academic or research institution International 
Organization 4 VVV Other  
Organization 5 JJJ   
(10) In which of the following types of activities have you been engaged with the ORGANIZATIONS you have 
just reported? (Please select all those that apply) 
NOTE: 
− Training: refers to training this organization employees and/or postgraduate training in the organization (e.g. joint supervision of 
PhDs). 
− Consultancy agreement: refers to work commissioned by this organization, which does not involve original research, e.g. 
conducting routine test, 
providing advice, etc. 
− Joint research or contract research agreement: refers to original research work done by both partners or University alone. 
 Training Consultancy agreement 
Joint 
research or 
contract 
research 
agreement 
Joint-authored 
presentation to 
conference, paper 
and other 
documents 
Setting up the organization or 
creation of new physical 
facilities (e.g. new laboratory, 
other buildings on campus, 
etc.) 
Other 
(Please 
specify) 
XXX       
YYY       
ZZZ       
VVV       
JJJ       
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) The following questions refer to your MAIN CONTACT PERSON in the 
organizations you have just reported. Please fill in the table below. 
 
(11) How often do you 
communicate with this 
person? (e.g. phone calls, 
mails, meetings, etc.) 
(12) How long 
have you known 
this person? 
(13) This person supplies me 
with information related to 
advances and discoveries in 
general 
(14) This person supplies me 
with information adapted to 
my own research needs 
XXX Daily <1 year Strongly disagree  
YYY Weekly 1−2 years Disagree  
ZZZ Monthly 3−5 years Agree  
VVV Quarterly 6−10 years Strongly agree  
JJJ Yearly >10 years   
 
 (15) I consider this person my friend 
(16) I ask this person for 
personal or professional 
advice 
(17) This person asks ME 
for personal or professional 
advice 
(18) I consider this 
person trustworthy 
XXX Strongly disagree    
YYY Disagree    
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ZZZ Neutral    
VVV Agree    
JJJ Strongly agree    
B. Kendall's tau-b correlation matrixes. 
Table 4: Relationships with firms and governmental organizations, N=303 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) Interaction Frequency     
(2) Years in contact 0,036    
(3) Friendship 0,246** 0,348**   
(4) Trust 0,213** 0,261** 0,562**  
(5) Reciprocity 0,270** 0,213** 0,523** 0,429** 
**p< 0,01 
Table 5: Relationships with universities, N=291 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) Interaction Frequency     
(2) Years in contact 0,125*    
(3) Friendship 0,295** 0,323**   
(4) Trust 0,253** 0,207** 0,583**  
(5) Reciprocity 0,240** 0,239** 0,477** 0,382** 
**p< 0,01, *p< 0,05. 
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